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NOTES

The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private
Homosexual Conduct
The laws of forty-three states and the District of Columbia impose
criminal penalties on consenting adults who engage in private homosexual conduct. Most of these laws are sodomy statutes, which also
prohibit oral and anal intercourse benveen heterosexuals and sexual
acts with animals.1 Two states have statutes explicitly limited to
homosexual conduct.2 These statutes also prohibit nonconsensual
homosexual activity and homosexual acts involving a minor, but this
Note addresses only prohibitions on private consensual adult homosexual conduct.
Although the immediate impact of statutes prohibiting such activity may be slight because complaints are infrequently brought,8
1. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 106 (1959); ALAs. STAT. § 11.40.120 (Supp. 1973); ARlz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-813 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 286, 288a (West 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.01-.02
(Supp. 1973-74) (§ 800.01 held unconstitutional for vagueness in Franklin v. State, 257
S.2d 21 (Fla. 1971)); GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-2002 (1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 768-71 (1968);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CoDE § 18-6605 (1948); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-4221 (Supp. 1974), amending IND. ANN. STAT. § 10--4221 (1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 705.1 (1950); KY. REv. STAT. ch. 510 (KY. REv. STAT. ch. 406, § 81(1) (Interim
Supp. 1974)); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-89 (1951); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1001
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 34 (1956);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158, .338-.338a (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (Supp.
1974); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (1949); MoNT. REv.
CoDES ANN. § 94-5-505 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-919 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 201.190 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.2 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-l
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-6 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-07 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 886 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 3124 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1
(1970); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16.412 (1962); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 22-22-21 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76--5-403 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit 13, § 2603 (1974) (although this statute prohibits only fellatio, the Supreme Court
of Vermont held sodomy to be a crime under the common law of Vermont in State v.
La Forrest, 71 Vt. 311, 45 A. 225 (1899); VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.1-212 (Supp. 1973), amending VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.100 (1956); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61--S-13 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-98
(Supp. 1973), amending WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-98 (1957).
The majority of states that prohibit homosexual conduct do so by forbidding
"crimes against nature," "sodomy," or "buggery." Other statutes are more explicit For
example, the District of Columbia statute provides:
[E]very person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus the
sexual organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing
his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal, or
who shall be convicted of having carnal copulation in an opening of the body except sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be
imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973). Only Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, lliinois, Ohio,
and Oregon do not punish private consensual adult homosexual conduct.
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1973); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 21.06 (1974).
3, Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal
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the existence of such laws has a significant impact upon homosexual
people in at least three ways. First, laws prohibiting homosexual conduct may inhibit persons inclined toward that mode of obtaining
sexual satisfaction from fulfilling their sexual desires. Second, the
laws may encourage blackmail by providing a means whereby homosexual people can be threatened with exposure or prosecution and
may discourage employers from hiring homosexual people for fear
that they may pose security risks because of their vulnerability to
blackmail.4 Finally, laws prohibiting adults from engaging in private
consensual homosexual conduct indirectly sanction existing discrimination against homosexual people in employment, housing, and public accommodations. 5
In Acanfora v. Board of Education6 a federal district court suggested a number of constitutional bases for a right to engage in
private consensual adult homosexual conduct, although it denied
relief on other grounds to a homosexual school teacher seeking reinstatement. The court suggested that prohibition of such conduct
might be an infringement of the liberty protected by due process
requirements,7 a violation of the right of privacy,8 a denial of equal
protection,9 or an encroachment on individual associational rights
under the first amendment.10 In a number of recent cases it has been
contended without success that punishment of homosexual conduct
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. 11 Reliance on the first12 and eighth18 amendments seems
Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded1, 80 MD,
L REV. 91, 95-97 (1970); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN
L REV. 274, 284-85 (1966); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law:
An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13
UCLA L REV. 643, 688-89 (1966).
4. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 409-11 (1973).
5. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4, at 5, col. 1 (late city ed.).
6. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd. on other grounds, 491 F,2d 498 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974).
7. 359 F. Supp. at 850. See also
BARNE1T, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
94-135 (1973); Note, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right To Be Different1, 38 A.LnANY
L REV. 84, 99-101 (1973).
8. 359 F. Supp. at 852. See also In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 447-48 (1967)
(holding that right of privacy does not apply to homosexual relationships among prisoners); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 495, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1967) (privacy
argument summarily dismissed because conduct occurred in public restroom); Hughes
v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, - , 287 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1972) (privacy argument not ap•
plicable where minor involved); W. BARNE'IT, supra note 7, at 52-73; Note, supra note 7,
at 92-96.
9. 359 F. Supp. at 852. See also W. BARNE1T, supra note 7, at 260-68; Chaitin &:
Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L REV. 24 (1973); Note, supra note 7, at 101-02,
10. 359 F. Supp. at 850. See also Note, supra note 7, at 98-99.
11. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 336-37 (W.D.N.C. 1964); People v.
Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 448 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256
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misplaced. This Note will examine the most promising of these
arguments-the due process, privacy, and equal protection claims
Cal. App. 2d 488, 495, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1967); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, -,
287 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1972); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312 n.2, 191 N.W.2d 185,
186 n.2 (1971). See also W. BARNErr, supra note 7, at 269-86; Note, supra note 7, at
96-98.
12. Freedom of association protects only the right "to associate with others for the
attainment of lawful purposes." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLUM. L. R.Ev.
1361, 1367 (1963). See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961). Thus, freedom of association does not determine whether a state can make unlawful the homosexual acts that are the object of
individual associations between homosexuals. Similarly, the argument that freedom of
expression protects homosexual acts because that conduct involves expression, at least
between the partners, seems weak. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), holds that
a state cannot punish an individual for mere private possession of obscene material,
but that case means only that freedom of expression protects the "right to receive information and ideas." 394 U.S. at 564. Freedom of expression does extend to some expressive acts, see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (picketing);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1940) (picketing), but the Court has stated
that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea." O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (statute prohibiting
knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificate upheld). See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 369 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The nonspeech aspect of homosexual
conduct is probably sufficient to exclude the acts from first amendment protection.
13. The eighth amendment argument relies on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962), and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Robinson held that a statute
imposing criminal penalties on narcotics addicts violates the eighth amendment
because it punishes individuals for a status over which they have no control. Powell
suggested that Robinson may be extended to include acts compelled by such a status.
Although five justices voted to sustain against an eighth amendment challenge a
conviction under a statute penalizing an individual for being found intoxicated in a
public place, the four dissenters and Justice White, the swing vote, agreed that if
Robinson prohibited punishment of a status such as chronic alcoholism, acts compelled
by that status must also be immune from punishment. Justice White, however, thought
that the defendant had made no showing that his acts were compelled by chronic alcoholism, The other four justices distinguished Robinson as applying only to statuses,
and not to acts. See also United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (majority relied on status/act distinction; four dissenters
would have allowed the defense of compulsion to crime of possession of heroin).
The argument that criminal punishment of homosexual behavior comes within the
prohibition of Robinson and Powell suffers from defects more serious than the unclear
consensus in Powell. First, the compulsion involved in homosexual acts is less clear
than the compulsion involved in narcotics addiction or chronic alcoholism. The present
understanding of homosexuality is that an individual's sexual preference is not the
result of a voluntary decision. See text accompanying notes 86-98 infra. However,
it does not necessarily follow that a homosexual person is compelled to engage in
homosexual acts. The sexual drive is a basic one, but some heterosexuals remain
celibate and certainly not every homosexual act is compelled. Furthermore, the contention that not all homosexual acts are a matter of choice implies the debatable conclusion
that homosexuality is a disease. In late 1973 the Board of Trustees of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) decided to remove homosexuality from the list of
mental diseases. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.). The Board's action
was approved by a general vote of the APA membership in April 1974, although only about
one half of the membership voted, and of that group two fifths disagreed. N.Y. Times,
April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4 (late city ed.). Second, the eighth amendment argument would
not invalidate the statutes forbidding private consensual homosexual acts but would
only require that persons charged under such statutes be allowed to defend on the
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-and attempt to evaluate them in light of the state interests in
forbidding private homosexual conduct.
The due process and privacy arguments are closely related; privacy
has been held to be protected by the due process clause.14 As far as
homosexual rights are concerned, there is little difference between
arguing that a new due process right should be recognized and
arguing that an established one should be expanded. However, the
first argument leads to a more expansive interpretation of the due
process clause than the second.
The theory that homosexual conduct per se is a fundamental
right protected from governmental infringement by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments rests on the notion
that due process guarantees not only certain procedural safeguards1G
but also a number of substantive rights.10 Although the Court has
become reluctant to apply the due process clause to state economic
regulation,17 it remains willing to strike down state laws infringing
on personal or civil rights where the competing state interests are
not adjudged compelling.18
To be protected under the traditional concept of substantive due
process, however, rights must be based upon "some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental." 19 This "fundamental rights" view of due
process would not embrace all of the specific guarantees against
federal action included in the Bill of Rights, but only those that are
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.''20 Opposed to this
ground that such acts were compelled. As under the insanity defense, the successful
defendant might be incarcerated in an institution, a result perhaps less appealing than
conviction. Moreover, the defense will only be successful where the defendant can
show that the homosexual acts were in fact compelled. The burden of proof may render
the defense useless. Finally, the argument may prove too much. It would also apply to
homosexual conduct that occurs in public, is accompanied by force, or involves a minor.
Acceptance of the argument would logically require constitutionalizing this kind of
psychic compulsion as an element of the insanity defense to any criminal charge. Cf.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront and examine
witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
16. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate one's
child as one chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study the German
language in a private school).
l'l. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
18. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973):
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). See text accompanying notes 118-67 infra.
19. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See generally Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 235, 236-40 (1965).
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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potentially broad interpretation21 is the incorporation approach,
according to which the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended only to make the entire Bill of Rights applicable
to state governments.22 A majority of the Court has never accepted
the doctrine of total incorporation of the first eight amendments.23
The Court has, however, selectively incorporated the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination24 and the sixth amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him,25
among other rights, and it has used the due process clause to protect
rights not expressly included in the Bill of Rights.26
In Griswold v. Connecticut21 the Supreme Court held the right
of marital privacy to be constitutionally protected. Although all of
the concurring justices applied the due process clause and found that
Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives infringed on the right
of privacy, they disagreed as to the constitutional source of the right.
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court appeared to follow the incorporation doctrine.28 He did not, however, insist on finding a right
of privacy explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, arguing instead that
a penumbra! right of privacy inheres in the first, third, fourth, fifth,
and ninth amendments.29 Justice Clark apparently endorsed this
approach since he joined no other opinion. In separate concurring
opinions Justices Harlan and White expressly rejected the incorporation approach in favor of the fundamental rights version of due
process.80 Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, emphasized "the relevance of [the Ninth] Amendment in the Court's holding." 31 This
21. As applied in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the fundamental rights
doctrine was more restrictive than the incorporation approach. It provided a basis for
deciding that some of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are not applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment. But the language of the test is so vague
that it could be used to embrace rights outside the Bill of Rights. For one such expansionary use of the test see text accompanying notes 27-33 infra.
22. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black 8c Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting). But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting}
(fundamental rights not confined to the Bill of Rights).
23. Kauper, supra note 19, at 240.
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
25. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally Kauper, supra note 19, at
238-39.
26. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (right not to be
arbitrarily excluded from bar); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (right of public
employee not to be dismissed arbitrarily).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Kauper, supra note 19, at 244.
29. 381 U.S. at 484-85. See also Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817,
24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Beilicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P .2d 288, 61
Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
30. 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. 881 U.S. at 487.
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approach approximates the fundamental rights view in result, because
Justice Goldberg reasoned that"... the Ninth Amendment simply
lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal
Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments. " 82
Eight years after Griswold seven justices agreed that the right of
privacy is founded squarely on the fourteenth amendment's concept
of personal liberty.33 In light of the Court's willingness to use the
flexible fundamental rights approach to expand due process liberty
to include the right of privacy, the way is now open to argue that the
right to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct is also
"fundamental" and therefore protected by the due process clause.
One criticism of this argument is suggested by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Roe v. Wade,34 in which the Court held that a woman's
right to an abortion was protected under the due process clause.
Rehnquist noted that "[t]he fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it
seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. . . .' " 35 That the laws of forty-three states and the
District of Columbia prohibit homosexual conduct arguably evidences a majority sentiment that the right to engage in such conduct
is not fundamental. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's argument was
not accepted by the majority in Wade. Moreover, the infrequent
enforcement of laws against homosexual conduct36 implies that they
do not reflect public sentiment.
Another criticism of the argument that homosexual conduct is
per se a fundamental right is directed against the fundamental rights
approach itself. It has been argued that the vagueness of the approach
leaves a court too free to inject its subjective values into the due
process clause.37 The resultant uncertainty may strain the federal-state
balance of power by. leaving state courts and legislatures with little
guidance in evaluating or formulating state laws. Despite this criticism the Court has apparently reaffirmed the fundamental rights
32. 381 U.S. at 493.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (opinion for the Court by Blackmun, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall 8: Powell, JJ.).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. 410 U.S. at 174, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
36. See materials cited note 3 supra.
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13, 528 (1965) (dissenting opinions by
Black & Stewart, JJ.); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-71 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 935-43 (1973).
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approach in Griswold and Wade. The danger of judicial subjectivity,
however, suggests that the Court may be reluctant to create fundamental rights beyond those already recognized.38
The recognition of a new fundamental right is not necessary,
however, if the right to engage in private consensual adult homosexual conduct is an aspect of the right of privacy. Because it has been
established that the due process clause protects the right of privacy,
further debate between adherents of the incorporation approach and
adherents of the fundamental rights test for defining the limits of
substantive due process would be irrelevant. Although Griswold
recognized a right of marital privacy, in none of the four opinions
that concurred in the judgment of the Court was there an affirmative
indication that the right extended beyond the protection of the
marital unit. Indeed, Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman? 9
which first recognized marital privacy as a fundamental right, explicitly excluded homosexual practices. Justice Goldberg's opinion in
Griswold also excluded deviant sexual conduct from the right and
cited Harlan's language in Poe with approval.40 Thus at least four
of the Griswold justices would definitely not have been willing to
expand privacy to include homosexual conduct.
Subsequently, however, in Eisenstadt v. Baird41 the Court suggested that the right of privacy included the right of unmarried
adults to use contraceptives. Although the Court based its holding
on an equal protection theory and did not decide the due process
question, it stated: "It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet ... [i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."42 If the right of privacy extends to the
sexual conduct of unmarried heterosexuals, it is hard to see why it
would not also apply to the private sexual conduct of homosexuals.
In Roe v. Wade 48 and its companion case Doe v. Bolton44 the
Court held that the right of privacy "was broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."45
The majority in Wade explained that"... only personal rights that
38. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right
to education not fundamental); Lindsey v. Norm.et, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (right to
decent, safe, sanitary housing not fundamental); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
485 (1970) (right to receive welfare payments not fundamental).
39. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
40. 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
41. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
45. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
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can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy,"46
and noted that the right of personal privacy had already had "some
extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, . . .
contraception, . . . family relationships, . . . and child rearing and
education ...." 47 As observed by Justice Douglas, these activities all
involve "the basic decisions of one's life." 48 The majority also stressed
the fundamental importance to a woman of her decision to have an
abortion:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and othenvise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.49

A homosexual's decision whether to follow his or her sexual
preference is also a basic one. It influences his or her choice of friends,
social activities, and family relations, and bears on the decisions to
marry and to procreate. 50 It may also influence one's self-image and
affect how one is perceived by others. The decision to abide by the
laws prohibiting homosexual conduct may result in psychological
harm through frustration of the preferred sexual outlet. 51
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Bolton seems to equate the right
of privacy with !a right of personal autonomy. He offers a "catalogue"52 of rights protected under the due process clause:
First is the autonomous control over the development anc& expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
46. 410 U.S. at 152, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, !302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
By ignoring Justice Rehnquist's claim that an abortion operation in a hospital
"is not 'private' in the ordinary sense of the word," 410 U.S. at 172 (dissenting opinion),
the majority extended the right of privacy beyond absolutely private conduct. But cf,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (right of privacy does not protect
showing of obscene material in a place of public accommodation).
47. 410 U.S. at 152-53, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 4!38 (1972) (contraception);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 5!35 (1942) (procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
48. 410 U.S. at 211-l2 (emphasis omitted) (concurring opinion in Doe).
49. 410 U.S. at 153.
50. Some homosexuals marry and have children despite their sexual preference,
however. P. Wn.soN, THE SEXUAL DILEMMA 52·53 (1970).
51. G. WEINBERG, SoClETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 78-82, 142-43 (1972),
52. 410 U.S. at 210.
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respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children.
Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom
from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf. 53

This approach would not lead to absolute protection of personal
whims because legitimate state incursions on personal autonomy
would still be upheld under the compelling state interest test. 64 But
it would require that that test be applied to a wider range of personal
interests-almost certainly including private homosexual conduct
-than would the majority's approach.
The lower federal courts and the state courts have given the
privacy argument a mixed reception. Some lower courts have interpreted the right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold as extending to any kind of private sexual activity between consenting
spouses.50 Where one participant is a minor,56 where force is involved,57 or where the challenged conduct does not take place in
private, 58 courts uniformly have refused to extend the protection
of the right of privacy. One district court, relying on Eisenstadt,
has suggested that the right of privacy protects private acts of sodomy
between unmarried, heterosexual consenting adults:
It is not marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal
the sexual behavior of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of
sexuality itself or something intensely private to the individual that
calls forth constitutional protection. While the condition of marriage
would doubtless make more difficult an attempt by government to
justify an intrusion upon sexual behavior, this condition is not a
prerequisite to the operation of the right of privacy.69
Several cases holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference with regard to citizenship60 and employment61 is an uncon53. 410 U.S. at 211-13 (emphasis original).
54. 410 U.S. at 215-18 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
56. Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025
(1972); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Pruett v. Te.xas, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
57. Towley v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969).
58. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Frazier, 256
Cal. App. 2d 630, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1967).
59. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973) (participants waived
right of privacy by allowing photographs of acts of sodomy to fall into hands of
daughters).
60. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Schlegel v. United States, 416
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stitutional invasion of privacy might also support the extension of
the right to private consensual adult homosexual conduct, although
the holding that discrimination against a class of individuals engaging in particular conduct is unconstitutional does not necessarily
imply that the right to engage in that conduct is constitutionally
protected.62
A finding that certain homosexual conduct is protected by the
right to privacy would not, without more, invalidate state laws prohibiting such conduct. The finding would simply subject the laws to
"strict scrutiny"-analysis of whether compelling state interests exist
that justify the prohibitions. Because the competing state interests are
the same under due.process and equal protection analysis, discussion
of them will be deferred until the equal protection avenues to strict
scrutiny have been explored.
The sodomy statutes may be attacked on equal protection grounds
because they discriminate against homosexuals. The discrimination
is obvious in statutes that explicitly prohibit homosexual intercourse
but do not prohibit any heterosexual acts. 63 Those that proscribe
all oral and anal intercourse64 prohibit some acts that may be engaged
in by heterosexuals; but they prohibit all forms of homosexual intercourse. The disparity between the treatments of homosexual and
heterosexual persons is reduced somewhat in thirteen states that
punish isolated acts of fornication and adultery 65 and to a lesser
extent in the District of Columbia and sixteen additional states that
punish only isolated acts of adultery. 66 However, the fornication and
F.2d 1372 (Ct. CI. 1969); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375,
82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). Contra, McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
62. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (although a state is not required to
provide appellate review, it may not do so in a way that discriminates against indigent
defendants).
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1973); TEX. R.Ev. C1v. STAT. ANN. § 21.06 (1974).
64. See statutes cited note I supra.
65. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2009 to -2010 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ '/68-13, -17
(1968); !I>AHO CODE §§ 18-6601 to -6603 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601,
-6603 (1948); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 101, 1551 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272,
§§ 14, 18 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.34 (Supp. 1974), 609.36 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:88-l, :110-1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-22-08 to -09, -11 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§ 11-6-2 to -3 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-103 to -104 (Supp. 1973);
VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-187 to -188, -190 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1966):
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.15-.6 (1958).
66• .AI.As. STAT. § 11.40.010 (1970); Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-221 (1956); COLO.
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-501 (Supp. 1971): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-81 (1972): D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-301 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (1950); KAN. STAT, ANN, § 21-3507
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 4 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 750.29-,30
(1968); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 28-902 (1964); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (Supp. 1973); N.Y.
PENAL LAW§ 255.17 (McKinney 1967): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 871-72 (1958): S.D.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 22-22-18 (1967): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (1974): WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9.79.110 (1956). One state punishes fornication but not single acts of
adultery. FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 798.03 (Supp. 1973-74).
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adultery laws do not close all legal outlets for heterosexual love,
as they do for homosexual love, and the penalties for these crimes are
usually much less severe than those imposed by the sodomy laws.61
Thus every state that prohibits oral and anal intercourse between
members of the same sex implicitly classifies individuals on the basis
of their sexual preference and discriminates against homosexuals.
These state classifications violate the fourteenth amendment if the
discrimination thereby created is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to
constitute a denial of equal protection.68 Over the past quartercentury the Supreme Court has been using a two~tiered standard
of review of equal protection cases.69 When neither a fundamental
right nor a suspect classification is involved, legislation is upheld so
long as the classification it creates bears some rational relation to a
constitutionally permissible purpose.70 When a fundamental right
67. For example, Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973), provides a minimum
punishment for sodomy of five years, and a maximum punishment of twenty years.
The maximum imprisonment for adultery is three years. Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-221
(1956). Fornication is not a crime in Arizona. See also AI.As. STAT. §§ 11.40.010 (1970),
.120 (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-301, -3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082.083, '798.03, 800.01 {Supp. 1973-'74); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2002 to -2010 (1972);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601, -6603, -6605 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601,
-6603, -6605 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ '702.1, '705.1-.2 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-3505, -3507, -4502 to -4503 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 101, 1001,
1551 (1964); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, §§ 14,
18, 34 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ '750.29-30, .158, .338-.338a, .503 (1968); NEB.
R.Ev. STAT, §§ 28-902, -919 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-22--07 to --08, -11 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 21, §§ 871-72, 886 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-6-2 to -3,
-10-1 (1969); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 22-22-17 to -18, -21 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 201, 2603 (1974) (see State v. La Forrest, '71 Vt. 311, 45 A. 225 (1899) (fine and
imprisonment for sodomy within judge's discretion)); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (Supp.
1973), amending VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-190, -212 (1960); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.'79.100, .110 (1956); w. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-3, -13 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 944.15-.1'7 (1958). But see CoLo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-501 (Supp. 1971) (adultery
punished but neither sodomy nor fornication punished); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53a-36, -81 (1972) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.36 (1964), 609.34, .293 (Supp.
1974) (adultery and sodomy punished equally, fornication punished less severely);
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 632:2, 645:3, 651:2 (Supp. 1973) (adultery and sodomy
punished equally, fornication unpunished); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ '10.15, 130.38, 255.17
(McKinney 1967) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-201, -204, 5-403, '7-103 to -104
(Supp. 1973) (adultery punished more severely than fornication and sodomy, which are
punished equally).
68. The federal government is similarly constrained by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, which includes the concept of equal protection. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
69. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065, 107'7,
1120-23 (1969).
'70. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485
(1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464-, 466 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552, 556-57
(1947); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145-47 (1940); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, '78-79 (1911). There is a line of cases involving the rights of indigents
to criminal appeals, however, that has elicited the strict scrutiny of the Court even
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or a suspect classification is involved, a stricter standard of review is
applied: Discriminatory legislation is upheld only when a state
demonstrates a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by
less drastic means. 71 The cases decided under the two-tiered standard
suggest that the resolution of a given case is determined largely by
which branch of the test the Court employs. Little legislation has
been struck down under the rational relation test; 72 little legislation
has been upheld under the strict scrutiny test. 73
It has already been argued in the due process context that sodomy
laws infringe upon fundamental individual rights. 74 Fundamental
rights for due process purposes include at least those rights that are
fundamental for equal protection purposes.76 The Court, however,
recently has been unwilling to expand fundamental rights in equal
protection cases. 76 Even if homosexual conduct is an equal protection
fundamental right, thereby subjecting sodomy laws to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause, the due process argument alone
would achieve the same result. Indeed, the charge has been made
that in general "[w]hen an equal protection decision rests on [the
fundamental right] basis, it may be little more than a substantive
due process decision decked out in the trappings of equal protection."77
The "suspect classification" arm 'of the equal protection test is
not similarly dependent on due process and arguably mandates strict
scrutiny of sodomy laws even if no fundamental rights are involved.
Classifications already held suspect by the Supreme Court include
those based on race,78 alienage,79 and national ancestry. 8°Four justices
though the right to a criminal appeal has not been held fundamental and wealth has
not been held to be a suspect classification. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Cf,
materials cited note 107 infra.
71. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No,
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
72. See cases cited note 70 supra. But see James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Stanley v. lliinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
'13. See cases cited note 71 supra. But see Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973);
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
74. See text accompanying notes 15-62 supra,
75. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (due process case citing equal
protection cases in support of holding that right of privacy is fundamental).
76. See cases cited note 38 supra.
77. Note, supra note 69, at 1132. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist, v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S.
618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
79. Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948).
80. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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have held that sex is a suspect classification.81 The following factors
have been suggested as typical of suspect classifications: The classifications are based on traits over which the individual has no control,82
the classifications "are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices
rather than legislative rationality,"83 the groups discriminated against
"are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political
process,"84 and they haye been "subjected to ... a history of purposeful unequal treatment."85
If homosexuality were physiologically determined, it would be
clear that the homosexual person has no control over his or her sexual
preference. There are, however, great differences of opinion regarding
the causes of homosexuality.86 Although some experimental studies
have adduced evidence that sexual preference is genetically determined,87 they are currently given little credence.88 The theory that
homosexuality is due to hormonal imbalance has also been rejected.89
The prevailing view now seems to be that homosexual orientation
"comes about as a result of experiences during the individual's
lifetime, rather than as a consequence of an inborn physical peculiarity."90 A psychoanalytic explanation of male homosexuality91 suggests
that it results from a parent-child relationship that includes a seductive, overattached, domineering mother and a detached, hostile
81. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). The Court has not yet held
suspect classifications based on wealth, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (wealth not suspect where classification does not entail
absolute deprivation); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956), or legitimacy of birth. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
Glona v. American Guar. & Llab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
82. Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
83. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
86. D. ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LmERATION 16 (1971).
87. The best known of these experiments is F.J. Kallmann's 1952 study of homosexual twins. Thirty-seven homosexual persons who had identical twins were studied,
and in every case the twin of the subject was also homosexually inclined. By contrast,
of 26 sets of fraternal twins in which one of the members preferred homosexual
conduct, only three sets were composed of pairs in which both twins were homosexually
inclined, an incidence no higher than that of the general population. D. WF.Sr,
HOMOSEXUALITY 169 (1968).
88. C. BERG &: C. ALLEN, THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY 41 (1958); B. OLIVER,
SEXUAL DEVIATION IN AMERICAN SoCIErY 126 (1967); SEx. INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
COUNCIL OF THE UNlT.l!D STATES, SEXUAI.ll'Y AND MAN 78 (1970).
89. W. BARNE'IT, supra note 7, 140-43; C. BERG &: C. A.I.LEN, supra note 88, at 41;
B. OLIVER, supra note 88, at 126.
90. D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 262. See also B. OLIVER, supra note 88, at 126.
91. This discussion is limited to causes of male homosexuality because little study
has been devoted to the causes of lesbianism. W. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 149.
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father. 92 Other commentators stress a combination of varied experiential factors in determining an individual's sexual orientation.03
Some gay liberationists assert, perhaps in order to refute the disease
model of homosexuality, that sexual orientation is in fact a matter
of individual choice.94
Regardless of the initial causes of homosexuality, an individual's
sexual orientation once acquired is extremely difficult to alter.ms
Although psychotherapists have reported cure rates of as high as
fifty per cent, such cures may include instances in which the individual is merely refraining from homosexual conduct while retaining
his or her homosexual inclinations.06 Nor do the :figures indicate
whether those "cured" remained heterosexually oriented.07 Moreover, even if psychoanalysis can alter sexual orientation, the expense
and the dearth of available analysts keeps the treatment out of the
reach of most homosexuals. 98 Homosexuality, therefore, can fairly
be characterized as a trait over which the individual has no control.
It can also be argued that discrimination against homosexuals is the
reflection of historical prejudice. As argued below,00 legislative classifications based on sexual preference are not the most rational way to
achieve most of the legitimate state ends that might justify the
prohibitions. Alternative statutory solutions do not exist if the goal
is moral condemnation of homosexuality, but such an aim is itself
indicative of a traditional bias against homosexuals. The lack of
a substantial relationship between other state goals and statutes
forbidding homosexuality suggests that the statutes intend only to
repress homosexuals, but this argument is weakened by the admission
that the statutes do have a minimal relation to some valid state
goa1s.100
Still, the political weakness of homosexuals and their history of
legal oppression suggest that a legislative classification based on
sexual preference is suspect. Like racial and ethnic minorities, homosexuals constitute a relatively small percentage of the adult population.101 No major political party has espoused homosexual rights.
92. I. BIEBER, H. DAIN, P. DINCE, M. DRELLICH, H. GRAND, R. GUNDLACH, M. KREMER,
A. R.!FKIN, C. WILBUR, T. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY, A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 310-13
(1962).
93. w. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 165; P. FISHER, THE GAY MYSTIQUE 35-41 (1972),
94. D • .ALTMAN, supra note 86, at 18.
95. D. WEST, supra note 87, at 266.
96. W. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 227.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 233.
99. See text accompanying notes 132-67 infra.
100. See text following note 123 infra.
101. Kinsey states that 37 per cent of the total male population has had some overt
homosexual experience and that 4 per cent of white males are exclusively homosexual

August 1974]

Notes

1627

The history of discrimination against homosexual individuals dates
at least from the Biblical period.102 Although not every society has
condemned homosexuality,103 Christianity's abhorrence of homo•
sexual conduct resulted in its prohibition in many Western states.104
When the Puritans emigrated to America, they brought with them
their aversion to homosexuality, thus giving early rise to the strict
prohibitions against homosexual conduct that remain substantially
in force in forty•three states and the District of Columbia.105 The
Victorian Age's revulsion toward all types of sexuality contributed
to the discrimination against homosexual individuals in the legal
systems of Great Britain and the United States.106
In sum, classifications based on sexual preference share fully
several of the indicia of suspect classes and share some of the others
to a lesser extent. The argument is worth advancing, but it is not
clear that the courts will recognize homosexuals as a suspect class.
The Court, however, has not always explicitly applied the two•
tiered standard; it has struck down state legislation that neither
infringed on fundamental rights nor discriminated against a suspect
class.107 Moreover, the rigidity of the division between the traditional
two tiers of review has led to a search for alternative versions of
the equal protection test.108 A standard with a less rigid gap between
strict and minimal scrutiny might offer more protection for homo•
sexual conduct.
In his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v.
throughout their lives. A. KINSEY, w. POMEROY&: C. MAllTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948). It has been claimed that Kinsey's figures exaggerate the
incidence of male homosexuality. Hunt, Sexual Behavior in the 1970's, Part VI: Deviant
Sexuality, 21 PLAYBOY, March 1974, at 54, 54-55.
102. Leviticus 18:22 states: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind;
it is abomination."
103. The Greek and Roman societies condoned, and even seemed to encourage,
homosexuality. H. ELus, PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 219 (1964); R. MITCHELL, THE HOMO·
SEXUAL AND THE LAW 14 (1969).
104. R. MITCHELL, supra note 103, at 14-15.
105. Id. at 15. See statutes cited notes 1-2 supra.
106. Id. at 15-16.
107. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). For a discussion of the possibility that these cases use an intermediate standard
see Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH.
L. REv. 508, 520-36 (1974).
108. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). Gunther's model will not be discussed here. It appears to have
found no support in the Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
l (1974), which seems to reaffirm. the traditional approach despite the fact that the ap•
pellate court employed a version of the Gunther test in reaching its decision. Boraas
v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973). See Note, supra note 107, at
547-51.
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Rodriguez109 Justice Marshall advocates a general balancing test in
which the state's interest in regulating conduct is weighed against
"the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification."110 Marshall's test does
not eliminate the categories of fundamental rights and suspect classifications, but tries to bridge the gap between strict and minimal
scrutiny by suggesting that there are degrees of "fundamentalness"
or "suspectness." Thus in Rodriguez Justice Marshall would have
required a strong state interest to justify discrimination in educational benefits on the basis of community wealth because "[e]ducation
directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment
interest,"111 and because group wealth hears many of the indicia of
suspect classifications.112 It was argued above that matters of private
heterosexual conduct and decisions regarding procreation that appear
to he largely included in the fundamental right of privacy are very
similar to the decision (if such it be118) to follow homosexual inclinations: They all are basic choices respecting~ one's total life style. The
decision to engage in homosexual conduct may affect one's heterosexual and procreational activity, especially where the decision is to
engage solely in homosexual conduct. This relationship to a fundamental right, while not as close as the nexus between education and
first amendment rights Justice Marshall found in Rodriguez, is
augmented by factors evidencing the suspect nature of a classification
based on sexual preference. Thus, under the Marshall approach, the
state should have to advance at least a fairly strong state interest to
justify the prohibition of private consensual adult homosexual conduct.
The chief criticism of this version of equal protection analysis is
that the weighing of interests involving nonconstitutional rights is
primarily a legislative and not a judicial function.114 Justice Marshall
counters this criticism by arguing that the balancing he proposes is
implicit in some of the Court's decisions purportedly reached under
the traditional minimal scrutiny standard and therefore should be
made explicit. 115 Justice Douglas joined Justice Marshall's dissent in
Rodriguez and Justice White has voiced some support for the approach.116 Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed
109. 411 U.S. I (1973).
110. 411 U.S. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also United States Dept. of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 519 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Ill. 411 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. 411 U.S. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. See note 13 supra; text accompanying notes 87-98 supra.
114. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 81 (1973).
ll5. 411 U.S. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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the two-tier standard in Rodriguez and in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas.111
Traditional minimal scrutiny in equal protection analysis is very
similar to the minimum scrutiny imposed on state laws under the due
process clause. Where no fundamental interest is involved, due process
also requires merely a rational relationship between the state law and
some legitimate state interest, and is equally deferential to state
legislative judgments.118 Neither of these minimum rationality standards requires that the government objective advanced to support the
challenged statute have been the legislature's purpose in enacting the
statute; the courts will search for a justification of their own.119
Moreover, the state may not even be required to prove that the
relationship between the statute and some legitimate state interest in
fact exists; it may be sufficient that the legislature could have believed
that such a relationship exists.120 However, equal protection is nevertheless denied if with respect to any plausible legislative goal the
statute is arbitrarily underinclusive121 or overinclusive.122 Underinclusion that imposes a burden is generally a much less serious
objection to a statute's validity than a burdening overinclusion.123
Under this test there are a number of interests that might justify
state prohibitions on private consensual adult homosexual conduct:
protection of individuals, especially children, from sexual coercion;
elimination or control of venereal disease; maintenance of a citizenry
that can function well in society; preservation of the traditional
institution of heterosexual marriage; and the guarding of public
morality. All of these state interests are arguably legitimate. As the
following discussion shows, most of them satisfy minimal scrutiny.
I£ the sodomy laws infringe on a fundamental right ·or involve
discrimination against a suspect class, however, they can be justified
under either due process or equal protection tests only by a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by any less drastic
117. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
118. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
119. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
120. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). But see Leathers v. City of Burns,
251 Ore. 206, 444 P.2d 1010 (1968).
121. "Under-inclusion occurs when a state benefits or burdens persons in a manner
that furthers a legitimate public purpose but does not confer this same benefit or
place this same burden on others who are similarly situated." Note, supra note 69, at
1084.
122. "An over-inclusive classification includes not only those who are similarly

situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well." Id.
at 1086.
123. Id.
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legislative means.124 State interests that have been held important
enough to qualify as compelling have included national security,12u
maintenance of an efficient and impartial governmental service,126
preparation of accurate voter lists,127 protection of viable fetal life,128
and protection of the health of pregnant women in the last two
trimesters.129 The state must also be able to prove that the legislation
in fact advances the alleged legislative purpose.180 Under strict scrutiny underinclusion and overinclusion can invalidate a statute even
if not arbitrary. How much disparity a court will tolerate depends on
its perception of the relative weights of the competing state interests
and individual rights involved.131 Where the scope of an overinclusive
statute could be narrowed and still achieve the state's goal, the statute
is also invalid on the ground that less drastic means are available.
Thus the compelling state interest/less drastic means test is difficult
for a state to satisfy. It seems doubtful that any of the state interests
in prohibiting homosexual conduct could satisfy this test.
The state's interest in protecting individuals from sexual coercion,
and more specifically in preventing child molestation or corruption,
is not directly advanced by prohibitions on private consensual adult
homosexual conduct. Nor is there settled proof that the prohibitions
on such conduct indirectly further these state interests. No correlation
has been proved benveen homosexual conduct and the incidence of
sexual violence.182 Furthermore, despite the fact that "[t]he argu124. The compelling state interest/less drastic means test was first applied to first
amendment cases. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 35'1 U.S. 449 (1958). For equal protection
cases applying the test see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (19'12); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See also Note, supra note 69, at 1087-132. Due process cases applying the test include
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
125. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Wyman v. Uphaus, 360
U.S. 72 (1959); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213 (1944). See also Linde, "Clear
and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN,
L. R.Ev. 1163 (1970).
126. United States Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
127. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973):
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
130. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973): Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972), quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (196'1).
131. Note, supra note 69, at 1101, 1103.
132. R. Mrrcm:u., supra note 103, at 12.
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ment most frequently advanced to support the continued statutory
treatment of homosexuals as felons is that homosexuals are a menace
to society in general and to children in particular,"183 the strength of
the correlation between homosexual conduct and the molestation
of children is in dispute.134 Moreover, one can argue that these state
interests may be served by less drastic means by removing the prohibitions on private consensual adult homosexual conduct while
retaining laws against homosexual conduct by force or with a minor.
A legal outlet for homosexual conduct might actually promote
compliance with the laws against homosexual conduct with a minor or
with a nonconsenting adult. The speculative nature of the relationship benveen these state interests and the prohibitions is probably
sufficient to satisfy minimal scrutiny but not strict scrutiny.
A more substantially related state interest is the control of
venereal disease, a major health problem,135 especially among homosexuals.136 This interest is probably sufficiently furthered by the
prohibitions to satisfy minimal scrutiny. The Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. W ade137 suggests that this state interest may even be
compelling. In that case the Court held that the State's interest in
protecting the health of a pregnant woman during the last nvo
trimesters of pregnancy was sufficient to justify placing restrictions
on the constitutionally protected right to have an abortion. If the
state's interest in protecting an individual's health is compelling, its
interest in maintaining public health through the control of contagious venereal diseases would seem even stronger. However, both
Wade and Doe v. Bolton,138 its companion case, invoked the less
drastic means limitation. Restrictions on the right to have an abortion
133. Project, supra note 3, at 787.
134. See studies cited in D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 117-18, which show a small
correlation between homosexuality and child molestation. See also Schofield, Social
Aspects of Homosexuality, 40 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 129, 130 (1964). Other
studies have revealed a higher percentage of pedophiles among homosexual men. For
example, in c. BERG, FEAR, PUNISlllffiNT, ANXIEIY AND THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 33-34
(1959), one study was reported in which, of 1,022 men in prison for homosexual offenses, 58 per cent involved offenses against boys under the age of 15. Similarly, according to a recent analysis of appellate cases involving the charge of sodomy, over 50 per
cent involved one or more children between the ages of five and nineteen. R. MITCHELL,
supra note 103, at 11. However, these higher percentages probably reflect the fact that
those who molest children are more frequently apprehended than homosexual people
who engage in sexual acts only with consenting adults. The fact that the distinction
between homosexuality and pedophilia has not been recognized is deplored by the
majority of homosexual people who " ••• do not share, do not approve, and fear to be
associated with paedophiliac interests." D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 119.
135. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1974, at 11, col. I (late city ed.).
136. Fluker, Recent Trends in Homosexuality in West London, 42 BRIT. J. VENEREAL
DISEASES 48 (1966),
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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are permissible only " ... to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."180
The state could use less drastic means to control venereal disease.
Sodomy prohibitions are overinclusive in that they affect both homosexual males and lesbians, although the latter "practically never
become infected except through contact with men." 140 They are also
overinclusive because they prohibit stable homosexual relationships
as well as isolated homosexual contacts, although only the latter are
responsible for the disproportionately high incidence of venereal
disease within the homosexual population.141 Thus, under strict scrutiny the state could probably justify at most regulation of infected
homosexuals.
It can be argued that the prohibition of all homosexual conduct
actually contributes to the spread of venereal disease. The high
incidence of venereal disease among homosexual individuals results
primarily from the promiscuous nature of many homosexual relationships,142 rather than from the distinctive characteristics of anal and
oral intercourse.143 Homosexual persons attribute the prevalence of
promiscuity primarily to the laws prohibiting homosexual conduct:
Many homosexuals say that they are so placed that, for fear of
the law, they dare not be known to have male friends. Having no
other means of finding partners, they have to resort to picking up
strangers "incognito" . . . . They say that the law as it now stands
leaves no alternative sexual outlet for the homosexual other tl1an
intercourse with strangers and male prostitutes and so encourages
the spread of venereal disease.1«

The prohibitions on homosexual conduct outlaw homosexual marriages,145 discourage stable relationships, and encourage furtive affairs.
The prohibitions also contribute to the higher incidence of venereal
disease among homosexual people by discouraging them from seeking
treatment or diagnosis. Although at present "[t]he diagnosis of
139. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
140. G. HENRY, Au. THE SEXES 366 (1955).
141. M. HoFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD 168 (1968); Jackson, Syphilis. The Role of the
Homosexual, 19 MEO. SERVICES J. CANADA 631, 634 (1963); Schofield, supra note 184, at
131-32.
142. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
143. Homosexual Practices and Venereal Diseases, 1964 LANCET (pt. 1) 481. But see
Schofield, supra note 184, at 132: "It should also be remembered that the promiscuous
homosexual does not use a sheath, and that this increases the chance of contracting
and passing on an infection."
144. Jefferiss, Venereal Disease and the Homosexual, 32 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES
17, 20 (1956). See also Schofield, supra note 184, at 131.
145. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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venereal diseases is manifestly more difficult in homosexuals because
of hidden lesions in the rectal and oral mucosa in the passive sexual
partner,''146 this difficulty would be simplified if homosexual individuals felt free to disclose their sexual orientation to a physician.147
If a physician is aware of the possibility of anal or oral infection, his
examination ·will generally disclose the hidden lesions.148 Efforts to
control venereal disease are also impeded because homosexual persons
at present do not aid medical authorities in locating infected contacts. Many homosexual persons are unable to name their partners
because their contacts are made anonymously to avoid exposure.149
Further, infected homosexuals are reluctant to incriminate themselves or their partners.150
The state interest in maintaining a socially effective citizenry can
justify the prohibitions only if it can be shown that homosexuality
hinders an individual from fulfilling most useful roles in society. The
authorities are divided over whether this relationship can be presumed. With regard to the homosexual's ability to function as an
employee one federal district court has stated:
Because of the potential for blackmail, [an employee's homosexuality]
might jeopardize the security of classified communications. . . . [I]t
may in some circumstances be evidence of an unstable personality
unsuited for certain kinds of work. If an employee makes offensive
overtures while on the job, or if his conduct is notorious, the reactions of other employees and of the public with whom he comes in
contact in the performance of his official functions may be taken into
account.151
Engaging in any homosexual activity still conclusively bars an individual from admission to the military.152 The Court of Claims has
stated: "Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent, lewd and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious
that this is true. If activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced
in a government department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of
the service will in time be adversely affected."153 However, the un146. Nicol, Homosexuality and Venereal Disease, 184 THE PRAcrmONER 345, 349
(1960); Trice &: Clark, Transmission of Venereal Diseases Through Homosexual Practices, 54 S. MED. J. 76, 79 (1961).
147. Jackson, supra note 141, at 632.
·
148. Trice, Homosexual Transmission of Venereal Diseases, 88 MEDICAL TIMES 1286
(1960).
149. Schofield, supra note 134, at 133.
150. Jefferiss, Homosexually Acquired Venereal Diseases, 42 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 46 (1966).
151. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Richardson v.
Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972).
152. R. MITCHELL, supra note 103, at 49-50.
153. Schlegel v. United States, 316 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1039 (1970).
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particularized and unsubstantiated contention that possible embarrassment to an agency stem.ming from an employee's homosexuality
may threaten the agency's performance has been rejected.1114 In the
area of public education it has been held that a male teacher's homo•
sexuality does not presumptively render him unfit to teach. 11:ili Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a Civil
Service employee could not be discharged for engaging in private
consensual adult homosexual conduct without a showing of an effect
on the efficiency of the service.156 Thus, while there may be certain
functions, such as military service or jobs involving classified information, for which homosexuals are presumptively unfit, homosexuality apparently does not unsuit an individual for all or even most
societal functions. Therefore, a ban on all homosexual activity will
not significantly further the state interest in maintaining an effective
citizenry.
It has been argued that the prohibition on homosexual conduct
is necessary to encourage new marriages and to prevent the breakup
of existing marriages.157 Although perhaps sufficient for minimal
scrutiny, this interest probably fails to meet the compelling state
interest/less drastic means test for several reasons. First, the relationship between the prohibition on homosexual conduct and the state's
interest in protecting marriages seems tenuous. Clearly the prohibition has no effect on homosexuals witli no interest in heterosexual
conduct; such persons will probably not enter into heterosexual marriages regardless of the prohibition. Moreover, the interest may
simply not be sufficiently important. Without articulating its reasons,
the Supreme Court summarily held in New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill158 that the state purpose to preserve and
strengthen traditional family life is not a compelling state interest
where individual rights to welfare benefits are concerned. Finally,
the use of a prohibition on homosexual activity as a means to preserve
the institution of heterosexual marriage is seriously underinclusive.
Extramarital heterosexual conduct may have a more detrimental
effect on marriage than extramarital homosexual conduct,1u0 but
154. Norton v. Macy, 41'7 F.2d 1161, 116'7 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
155. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), af/d. on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974):
Morrison v. State 13d. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 361 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
156. Norton v. Macy, 41'7 F.2d 1161 (1969). See also Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d
740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972), Cf,
13outilier v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 38'7 U.S. 118, 128 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting): "It is common knowledge that in this century homosexuals have risen high
in our own public service-both in Congress and in the Executive 13ranch-and have
served with distinction."
15'7. P. Wn.soN, supra note 50, at 52.
158. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
159. P. WILSON, supra note 50, at 52.
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fornication and adultery are not prohibited in all states.160 In those
states in which adultery and fornication are proscribed the penalties
are often much less severe than for homosexual acts.161 The disparity
in punishment constitutes a form of underinclusion and indicates that
the states either do not regard the preservation of heterosexual marriages as the real purpose of the prohibition on homosexual conduct
or do not regard that purpose as sufficiently compelling to warrant
full use of the state's power to penalize.
The strongest argument a state can marshal to justify abridgements of a homosexual's rights is based on the state's interest in preserving " 'the tone of the society, the mode, ... the style and quality
of life.' " 162 In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton163 the Supreme Court
held that a state prohibition on the showing of obscene movies in
places of public accommodation was justified in order to prevent the
spread of antisocial behavior. The Court's opinion does not define
"antisocial behavior," but the term appears to include all sexual conduct that a state might consider immoral. In dictum included in his
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 164 Justice Harlan explicitly tied a state's
interest in guarding public morality to the prohibition of private
adult consensual homosexual conduct:
... [S]ociety is not limited in its objects only to the physical wellbeing of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with
the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line
between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or
solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding marriage which provide both
when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express
the negative of the proposition confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build
upon that basis.165
In one sense Paris Adult Theatre I is a harder case than one
160. See statutes cited notes 65, 66 supra.
161. See statutes cited note 67 supra.
162, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973), quoting Bickel, On Pornography II, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25 (1971).
163. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
164. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
165. 367 U.S. at 545-46. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965), Justice
Goldberg quoted approvingly from Harlan's dissent in Poe. Justice Goldberg's quota-

tion of Harlan indicates that neither he nor Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
who joined Goldberg's opinion, question a state's right to forbid homosexual conduct
on moral grounds.
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involving prohibition of homosexual conduct. Because Paris Adult
Theatre I involved no fundamental rights the Court did not apply
the compelling state interest test and did not require proof of the
connection between the showing of obscene movies and antisocial
behavior. In defending a prohibition on homosexual conduct, there
could not be a proof problem; the prohibition on the conduct the
state views as immoral clearly -furthers the state interest in condemning that conduct. A less drastic means might be the use of
persuasion rather than the power of the criminal law, but it is questionable how effective that alternative would be.
The extent to which a state legislature is free to legislate morality,
however, is in dispute. 166 Whether or not it can, the state interest in
branding as immoral individual private homosexual conduct cannot
be compelling if the right to engage in such conduct is indeed a
fundamental right, because the state's interest would then be diametrically opposed to the value embodied in the constitutional right.
In other words, the question whether the state can legislate morality
in this area is precisely the same as the question whether the exercise
of homosexuality is a fundamental right for due process purposes.
The foregoing due process analysis167 thus is also an argument that
the state's interest in legislating moral judgments with regard to
homosexual conduct is not legitimate, much less compelling.
The due process argument therefore stands or falls on whether
private consensual adult homosexual conduct is a fundamental right.
If it is not, the state's interests in controlling venereal disease and in
legislating morality should be sufficient to withstand minimal scrutiny. Similarly, the success of the equal protection argument under
the traditional two-tier standard depends on whether a fundamental
right or a suspect class is involved.
Justice Marshall's approach to equal protection, however, may
offer an avenue to constitutional protection even if strict scrutiny
cannot be invoked.168 It has already been argued that an individual's
interest in engaging in homosexual conduct has a sufficiently close
connection w_ith the constitutional right of privacy and that homosexuals have sufficient indicia of a suspect class to raise the scrutiny
the sodomy laws must withstand above the level of minimal rationality.169 Objections to state regulation based on underinclusion,
overinclusion, or the availability of less drastic means, however, are
probably less telling where fundamental rights or suspect classes are
166. See, e.g., P.
ERTY AND MORALITY

THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS (1959); H. HART, LAw, LID•
(1963); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75

DEVLIN,

YALE LJ. 986 (1966).
167. See text accompanying notes 14-62 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
169. See text following note 112 supra.
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not involved. The state interests in controlling venereal disease and
promoting traditional heterosexual marriages might thus provide
stronger arguments for the state under Marshall's test than under
strict scrutiny, although the state's interest in governing sexual morality is subject to the same criticism as under the two-tier standard:
To the extent that a court finds a nexus between an individual's interest in engaging in private consensual adult homosexual conduct
and the right of privacy, it cannot also embrace the opposite value
judgment that a state has a strong interest in intruding upon individual sexual morality. It is difficult to foresee how a court will weigh
the competing interests when they are evaluated on these sliding
scales because, as its critics have pointed out,' 70 Justice Marshall's
test leaves much room for judicial value judgments. Nevertheless, it
seems that the state's burden of proof might well be too demanding
under this test to justify prohibiting homosexual conduct on the
basis of any of the state interests discussed above.
Aside from the unclear result under Justice Marshall's test, there
is a tactical reason for advocates of homosexual rights to eschew novel
constitutional theory and hew to well-established doctrine: Homosexuality is simply too controversial a topic to expect a court to
create new constitutional law in order to protect it. Even the recognition of a new suspect class for equal protection purposes, a step the
Court has recently been unwilling to take, may be too much of a
doctrinal development to expect. But the developing right of privacy
offers a traditional constitutional argument that requires no major
doctrinal change in order to protect homosexuality. In extending the
right of privacy to all forms of heterosexual conduct, the courts have
gone so far that exclusion of homosexuality cannot be justified. The
privacy argument is dearly the best argument and one that should
succeed in securing constitutional protection for the private exercise
of consensual adult homosexual activity.

170. See text accompanying note 114 supra.

